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# Algorithms: Economic Behavior, Network Games etc.

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Sanjiv Kapoor (kapoor@iit.edu)  
Illionis Institute of Technology


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# Market Equilibrium

- The market equilibrium problem
- History






# Market Model (separable utilities)



- $n$  traders and  $m$  goods
- Each trader has initial endowments of money or goods
- $a_{ij}$  = amount of commodity  $j$  with trader  $i$
- Trader  $i$  has a utility for good  $j$ .


# Walras Market Model


Agents/Buyers






Initial endowment of goods

Prices


 = \$25

 = \$15


 = \$10



# Market: Model




\$50




\$60

Maximize Utility

$$U_i : (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$$




\$40




\$40

Agents/Buyers




Goods




Prices

●=\$25 ●=\$15 ●=\$10

# Market: Model




\$50




\$60

Agents/Buyers




Goods




Prices

●=\$25 ●=\$15 ●=\$10

Find prices so that Demand = Supply



\$40



\$40

Maximize Utility

$$U_i : (x_1, \dots, x_n) \rightarrow \mathbf{R}$$

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# The General Market Model (Walras)

- $n$  traders and  $m$  goods
  - Each trader has initial endowments of goods  
 $a_{ij}$  = amount of commodity  $j$  with trader  $i$
  - Traders have utilities on commodity bundles  
 $u_i: \mathbb{R}_+^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ .
  - The market allows traders to exchange commodities
  - Each trader acts independently to maximize its own happiness
  - Market equilibrium achieved when there is no incentive to trade
-

# Mathematical formulation: Market Equilibrium

- Commodities are divisible
- $x_{ij}$ : the amount of commodity  $j$  with trader  $i$  after the trade
- Commodity  $j$  has price  $p_j$
- No excess or deficiency of any commodity

$$\forall j : \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^n a_{ij}$$

$$\forall i : \sum_{j=1}^m x_{ij} p_j = \sum_{j=1}^m a_{ij} p_j$$

Maximize :  $u_i(x_{ij})$

Subject to :  $\sum_{j=1}^m x_{ij} p_j = \sum_{j=1}^m a_{ij} p_j$



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# The Fisher's Market Model

- Special case of the Walrasian Model
  - There are  $n$  buyers and  $m$  goods
  - Buyers have only money  
(buyer  $i$  has  $e_i$  units of money)
  - Goods must be all sold, buyers maximize their bang/buck.
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# Market Equilibrium History

- Posed by
    - 1891 Fisher
    - 1894 Walras (Walrasian Equilibrium)
  - Existence
    - 1954 Arrow and Debreu
  - Computation
    - Hydraulic apparatus by Fisher
    - Tatonnement process (Walras)
      - Does it converge?
    - Arrow et al. 1959
      - Stability of a local greedy price adjustment method for “Gross Substitute” utility functions
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# Computation of Market Equilibrium

- Eisenberg and Gale, 1959
    - Fisher model, additive linear utilities
    - Reduced the problem to a convex optimization problem
  - Eaves, 1976
    - Linear complementarity problem
    - Lemke's algorithm
  - Newman and Primak, 1992
    - Ellipsoid method – polynomial-time method
-

# Computation of Market Equilibrium

- Devanur , Papadimitriou, Saberi, Vazirani, 2002
  - Fisher model, separable additive and linear utilities
  - Combinatorial algorithm based on max flows Complexity:  $n^{4/\varepsilon}$  max-flow computations  $\sim n^{7/\varepsilon}$
- Jain et al 2003, Devanur and Vazirani 2003
  - Approximation algorithm for Walrasian model, linear utilities
- Jain, 2004
  - General Walrasian model, additive linear utilities, uses Ellipsoid method (inequalities surprisingly similar to Eisenberg and Gale)
- Ye 2004
  - Interior Point method ,  $O(n^4 L)$

# Computation of Market Equilibrium

- Auction Algorithm [GK04a]
  - Linear utilities, Walrasian model
  - Separable Gross Substitutes [GKV04b]
  - Auction Algorithms for Production [KMV05]
  - More General Gross-Substitute Functions [GK06]
- Exact Algorithms for Fisher Model [GK07]
- Algorithms for Resource Allocation markets [FGKKS08]
- Auction for general production models [KS09]

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# Techniques Used

- Flow based
    - Combinatorial, slow
  - Reduction to convex optimization problems
    - Solves for a large class of utility functions
    - Little Economic interpretation
  - Interior point method
    - Similar to convex optimization reductions
  - Greedy methods based on convex optimization problem
  - Auction based
    - Simple and distributed
    - Fast and intuitive
    - Economic interpretation
    - Approximate
    - Need to be extended to more general models
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# Auction Algorithms for Market Equilibrium [GK04]

- General Walrasian model
  - Additive linear utilities
  - Approximation algorithm
  - Decentralized and distributed
  - Simple
  - Natural auction interpretation
  - Complexity:  $1/\epsilon n^3 \log v_{\max}$  steps
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# Price Rollbacks and Path Auctions

- Fisher Model
  - Linear utilities
  - $(1+\varepsilon)$  approximation
    - $O(n^3 + n^2 \log M) \log(1/\varepsilon)$  time
  - Solution is rational
  - Exact solution in  $O((n^3 + n^2 \log M) L)$  time
  - Relation to max flows
-



# The Market Equilibrium Problem

- Linear, additive utilities:  $u_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^m v_{ij} x_{ij}$

- A family of linear programs

- $x_{ij}$  is a solution to:

$$\text{Maximize : } \sum_{j=1}^m v_{ij} x_{ij}$$


$$\text{Subject to : } \sum_{j=1}^m x_{ij} p_j \leq e_i$$

- Markets clear:

$$\forall j : \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ij} = a_j$$


$$\forall i : \sum_{j=1}^m x_{ij} p_j = e_i$$

# Auction Mechanism



- G1 has maximum utility/price for A upto \$15
- G1 has maximum utility/price for B


# Auction Mechanism



- G1 is maximum utility/price for A upto \$15 after which G2 has max utility/price for A

# Network Optimization and Games

- Multiple Path Network Routing



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
# Issues

- Routing Delays
  - Requirement of Buffers at End/Intermediate Nodes
  - Recent Work-
    - Multipath Routing with Bounded Buffers (INFOCOM 2010)
    - Multiple Source Sink Flows with Bounded Buffers (ICC 2010)
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# Network Games

## Multiple Path Network Routing



Can be modeled as a 2-player Game (Zero-Sum)

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## ■ ABSTRACT FILE SYSTEMS

- Users have a large amount of personal files/e-mails due to increased storage space availability for a fraction of the cost.
- Most widely used organizational structure : Hierarchical-Tree

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## ■ Limitations

- ❑ A file is accessed by a unique address known as the file path.
- ❑ Organizing is done by using directories, sub-directories, and filenames with extension.
- ❑ It is not very flexible



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# The Concept

- A methodology to extend the file organization into a user-defined, Multi-hierarchy - Abstract File System


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# Example ...

- Consider the following structure of files

Pictures/2006/dad  
Pictures/2005/dad  
Pictures/2006/mom  
Pictures/2005/mom  
Pictures/2006/baby  
Pictures/2005/baby

# Example ...



# Example ...

- ▶ Suppose we wanted to access all files which involve dad, i.e.

Pictures/dad

- ▶ The number of files may be substantial and so it is desired that these may be classified further as


Pictures/dad/2005

Pictures/dad/2006

Pictures/dad/baby

Pictures/dad/mom

# Logically Tagged File Structure



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# Structured Keywords & Abstract Directories

- We create the notion of structured keywords and abstract directories so that files can be organized in any user specified hierarchies.
- This is akin to a hyper-edge labeled with a hierarchical meta-label (Figure below)

